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TILTED SCALES OF JUSTICE? THE CONSEQUENCES OF
THIRD-PARTY FINANCING OF AMERICAN LITIGATION
ABSTRACT
Third-party financing of commercial litigation is a relatively new
phenomenon in the United States. Recently, there has been a substantial
increase in the amount of money that third parties have invested in commercial
lawsuits. Many new investment management groups have been formed in cities
such as New York, London, and Sydney looking to finance the endless stream
of American litigation. These groups are for-profit entities that fund all or a
portion of a plaintiff’s legal fees in exchange for a share of any recovery that
might result from the underlying lawsuit. The third-party litigation funders, as
they are often called, put their “skin in the game” by risking the loss of their
investment if the underlying claim is unsuccessful. The calculated risk these
third-party litigation funders take has systematically resulted in astronomical
returns for the companies and their investors.
In the process of seeking these astronomical returns, third-party litigation
funders are causing a disparate impact on the American legal system by
tipping the scales of justice in favor of plaintiffs at the expense of defendants.
Supporters of third-party litigation financing in the legal community argue
that, by allowing plaintiffs to seek outside financial support, barriers to justice
are reduced because the funding enables cash-strapped plaintiffs to have their
day in court. However, in reality, third-party litigation funders have little
incentive to fund plaintiffs facing substantial barriers to justice. Third-party
litigation funders invest in cases where the risk is the lowest and the possible
return is the highest. Using the law to their favor, third-party litigation funders
invest in cases where the underlying law giving rise to the plaintiff’s claim
already gives substantial advantages to plaintiffs in the form of low evidentiary
thresholds and large statutory damage awards. Third-party litigation financing
only magnifies these advantages by allowing plaintiffs to offload risk,
increasing the number of cases adjudicated in the courts and raising the
threshold amount required for plaintiffs to settle a case because of third-party
funders’ return requirements. Overall, third-party litigation financing
threatens the compensatory and deterrent functions of the legal system while
increasing inefficiency in the process.
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This Comment addresses third-party litigation financing’s threat to the
legal system by proposing three possible solutions. First, this Comment argues
that caps should be imposed on the percentage of any damage award a thirdparty litigation funder could receive. The result of a cap on recovery for thirdparty litigation funders would be a decrease in the concentration of funding for
only the lawsuits with the highest potential damages, which, in turn, would
decrease the amount required for settlement. Plaintiffs would be less likely to
go to court because their well-funded backers would have lower investment
limits in order to keep their return targets on track, and many plaintiffs could
not afford the cost of pursuing litigation themselves. Second, this Comment
suggests that a national registration requirement be imposed for third-party
litigation funders to increase accountability within the industry and inform
potential consumers of third-party financing. Third, this Comment advocates
for the expansion of already enacted state regulations of third-party litigation
funders to protect consumers in the commercial litigation context. Overall, the
caps, registration requirements, and expansion of enacted legislation balance
efficiency, deterrence, and compensation while still allowing for financially
constrained plaintiffs to seek the outside funding they may need to pursue a
meritorious claim.
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INTRODUCTION
As Michael Cannata, principal of Patent Monetization Inc., has stated, “[a]s
long as the US [litigation] market continues to be one of the world’s
largest . . . and the biggest pay-outs are available, this is going to be attractive
for [third-party] investment.”1 The attractiveness of the U.S. litigation market
is evident from the amount of money third-party funders are willing to invest
in various lawsuits. On average, third-party funders invest between $2 million
and $15 million in a single complex commercial litigation lawsuit.2 This
substantial investment is made in the hope of multimillion-dollar payoffs,3
which often occur, resulting in a rate of return of up to 200% on a single
lawsuit asset.4
1

Jack Ellis, Patent Litigation as an Asset Class, INTELL. ASSET MGMT., Nov.–Dec. 2012, at 43, 46, 49
(internal quotation mark omitted). Patent Monetization Inc. is a private third-party litigation-financing firm. Id.
at 44.
2 See Catherine Ho, Investment Firms Playing Role in Legal Field, WASH. POST, Dec. 12, 2011, at A14
(stating that Burford Group, a New York–based third-party funder, routinely invests between $2 million and
$15 million in any one lawsuit); see also Kevin LaCroix, Litigation Funding: A U.S. Growth Industry?, D & O
DIARY (Apr. 10, 2012), http://www.dandodiary.com/2012/04/articles/securities-litigation/litigation-funding-aus-growth-industry/ (stating that litigation finance company BlackRobe Capital Partners LLC invests between
$2 million and $8 million in complex commercial litigation cases).
3 William Alden, Looking to Make a Profit on Lawsuits, Firms Invest in Them, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 30,
2012, 6:07 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/04/30/looking-to-make-a-profit-on-lawsuits-firms-investin-them/.
4 See Paul M. Barrett, Lawsuit Finance Moves Up the Food Chain, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, Jan.
16–22, 2012, at 42, 42 (discussing a case where Burford Capital “invested $6 million in a breach-of-contract
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Third-party litigation companies can keep as much as 40% of the proceeds
that result from the underlying litigation asset,5 which often causes plaintiffs to
receive very little recovery from their claims. One example of disproportionate
plaintiff recovery involves DeepNines, a Texas-based security company, which
obtained $8 million in third-party financing to pursue patent infringement
litigation against a competitor.6 In the end, the parties agreed on a settlement of
$25 million, $10.1 million of which went to the third-party litigation funder.7
Almost the entire remaining damage award went to legal fees, resulting in
DeepNines’s net recovery of only $800,000.8 The third-party litigation funder
ended up with a return of over 126% while the plaintiff received barely 3% of
the total recovery.9 Overall, third-party litigation funders are focused on where
they can get the highest rate of return,10 with some of the largest third-party
litigation funders seeing annual returns of up to 91% on their U.S. litigation
investments.11
The growth of third-party litigation finance has most negatively impacted
defendants. The huge sums being invested in commercial litigation results in
distorted incentives for plaintiffs.12 As James E. Tyrrell, Jr., regional managing
partner at Patton Boggs LLP, has pointed out, “[t]he abundance of funds now
available to plaintiffs may have ‘tipped the funding scales’ toward plaintiffs,
creating an imbalance of resources,”13 which raises some concern about access
to justice for defendants. Plaintiffs may be less likely to settle disputes if they
can off-load much of the risk that usually accompanies a trial onto third-party

lawsuit between two Arizona real estate developers,” and, once damages were paid out, Burford received
“more than $18 million . . . a 200 percent return”).
5 See Ho, supra note 2 (discussing practice of Burford Capital).
6 Lisa Rickard, Why Are Hedge Funds Allowed to Invest in Litigation?, ATLANTIC (July 3, 2012, 1:42

PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2012/07/why-are-hedge-funds-allowed-to-invest-in-litigation/259345/.
7

Id.
Id.
9 See id.
10 See Daniel Fisher, Juridica Chief Used to Argue Lawsuits, Now He Invests in Them, FORBES (Oct. 12,
2012, 10:07 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2012/10/12/juridicia-chief-used-to-argue-lawsuitsnow-he-invests-in-them (quoting Juridica Investments Ltd. CEO Richard Fields saying, “We’re focused on
how to get the biggest IRR [internal rate of return]” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
11 See Alden, supra note 3; see also Fisher, supra note 10 (stating that Juridica Investments Ltd. claims
an 85% rate of return on completed investments).
12 See Joanna M. Shepherd, Ideal Versus Reality in Third-Party Litigation Financing, 8 J.L. ECON. &
POL’Y 593, 609 (2012).
13 GEOFFREY MCGOVERN ET AL., THIRD-PARTY LITIGATION FUNDING AND CLAIM TRANSFER: TRENDS
AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM 9–10 (2010), available at http://www.rand.org/content/
dam/rand/pubs/conf_proceedings/2010/RAND_CF272.pdf.
8

RICHEY GALLEYSPROOFS

2013]

1/31/2014 10:48 AM

TILTED SCALES OF JUSTICE

493

litigation funders.14 Further, these plaintiffs may bring frivolous lawsuits,
resulting in inefficiencies in the legal system and higher costs for both
parties.15 For the plaintiffs, these higher costs are often borne by the third-party
litigation funders, but defendants must shoulder the costs themselves.
Consequently, litigation costs rise because plaintiffs can prolong litigation due
to their extensive third-party backing.16 Even more significant is that thirdparty litigation funders do not seem to invest in the types of cases where
plaintiffs are in need of access to justice.17 Instead, these funders invest in the
cases that are the most likely to be successful and have the highest potential
damage awards, which are primarily patent infringement and antitrust
lawsuits.18
The growth of third-party litigation financing is a threat to the judicial
system. This Comment proposes putting caps on the amount a third-party
litigation funder can recover, similar to contingency caps for attorneys’ fees,
which are already in place in some states.19 By reducing the potential recovery,
these caps would decrease the amount a third-party litigation funder is willing
to invest in any given lawsuit because the possible return on investment is
diminished.20 Overall, this solution would likely decrease settlement amounts,

14 See Rickard, supra note 6 (“[Third-party litigation financing] supporters allege that the practice is riskfree for plaintiffs, since, if they lose, they typically don’t have to repay the investor.”).
15 See Ellis, supra note 1, at 46 (quoting Gary Rubin, who conducted research on behalf of the U.S.
Chamber Institute for Legal Reform and found that, when making investment decisions, third-party litigation
funders consider many aspects besides just the legal merit: “The legal merit of a lawsuit, however, is only one
component of [the investment decision] calculus—the other being the potential amount of recovery. If that
potential recovery is sufficiently large, the lawsuit will be attractive as an investment vehicle even if the
likelihood of achieving that recovery is small. When the potential recovery is large enough, there will always
be willing investors”). David Abrams and Daniel Chen conducted a study of the effect of third-party litigation
finance in Australia and found that “litigation funders appear to have an impact on the functioning of courts.
States that have a greater litigation funding presence experience a greater backlog in courts, fewer
finalizations, and a lower clearance rate. This is also reflected in court expenditures, which increase with
greater litigation funding.” David S. Abrams & Daniel L. Chen, A Market for Justice: A First Look at Third
Party Litigation Funding 1, 31 (Jan. 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at
https://www.law.upenn.edu/cf/faculty/dabrams/workingpapers/MarketforJustice.pdf.
16 See JOHN BEISNER ET AL., SELLING LAWSUITS, BUYING TROUBLE: THIRD-PARTY LITIGATION
FINANCING IN THE UNITED STATES 6 (2009), available at http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/sites/default/
files/thirdpartylitigationfinancing.pdf.
17 See Shepherd, supra note 12, at 609 (“[M]any of the cases financed by the largest third-party investors
are the opposite of the types of cases where financing could improve access to justice for vulnerable
plaintiffs.”).
18 Vanessa O’Connell, Funds Spring Up to Invest in High-Stakes Litigation, WALL STREET J., Oct. 3,
2011, at B1 (“The funders tend to bet on patent or antitrust cases for the biggest profit . . . .”).
19 See infra notes 196–98 and accompanying text (identifying existing state caps on contingency fees).
20 See infra Part V.A.
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while keeping third-party litigation financing available for needy plaintiffs and
increasing judicial efficiency and fairness at the same time.21 In addition to the
aforementioned caps, this Comment suggests other solutions, such as state or
national registration requirements for third-party litigation funders22 and
expanding existing state statutory regulations governing the litigation financing
industry to apply in the commercial-litigation financing context.23
This Comment’s five parts lend support to these proposals. Part I presents a
brief background and overview of the current state of the third-party litigation
financing industry (section A), addressing arguments promoting its widespread
growth (section B) and the general problems that third-party litigation has been
found to create in practice (section C).
Part II examines the historic prohibition on uninterested third-party
involvement in litigation through the doctrines of maintenance and champerty
(section A), including a brief breakdown of the current treatment of the
doctrines in the United States (section B).
Part III addresses the risk imbalances created by the intersection of thirdparty litigation financing and treble damage litigation where funders tend to
invest significant portions of their portfolios. It identifies the risk imbalances
caused by treble damage statutes (section A), the attractiveness of treble
damage cases for third-party investors (section B), and the consequences of the
presence of third-party litigation financing in antitrust and patent infringement
litigation (section C).
Part IV addresses current state laws that attempt to regulate third-party
litigation financing (section A), ultimately concluding that these regulations do
not protect parties in the commercial litigation context (section B).
Part V proposes solutions to regulate the third-party litigation financing
industry. These solutions include: (1) capping the recovery of third-party
litigation funders (section A), (2) enacting registration requirements for thirdparty funders (section B), and (3) expanding and applying the enacted state
legislation regulating third-party litigation financing to commercial litigation
(section C).

21
22
23

See infra Part V.A.
See infra Part V.B.
See infra Part V.C.
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I. THE CURRENT STATE OF THIRD-PARTY LITIGATION FINANCING
Third-party litigation financing has grown from an industry that was based
primarily around small lawsuit loan agreements into a multimillion-dollar
investment vehicle for hedge funds, private equity firms, insurance companies,
banks, and high net worth individuals.24 In this Part, section A traces the
growth of the third-party litigation financing industry in the United States and
also discusses how third-party financing of commercial litigation is different
from other types of litigation financing, such as lawsuit loans and
presettlement funding. Next, section B discusses the arguments in favor of the
continued growth of third-party litigation financing. Finally, the problems that
third-party litigation financing causes in practice are addressed in section C,
demonstrating that third-party litigation financing results in a distortion of the
risk and cost deterrents that prevent many prospective plaintiffs from pursuing
litigation.
A. Background and Overview of Third-Party Litigation Financing
The basic premise behind third-party litigation financing as addressed in
this Comment is that the funders offer a financial advance collateralized with
the opportunity for recovery of a portion of any damages resulting from the
successful outcome of the financed lawsuit.25 Third-party litigation financing is
not a new industry in the United States. Two forms of third-party investment
have been in practice since the 1990s: presettlement funding and the
syndicated lawsuit.26 Both of these types of financing are rooted in the
contingency fee model of litigation financing, where an attorney will advance
services (representation in litigating the claim) and other costs associated with
adjudicating a claim in exchange for a percentage of the recovery from the
lawsuit.27 The presettlement funding industry involves cash advance loans by
third-party lending companies to plaintiffs, typically personal injury plaintiffs,
24 See Holly E. Loiseau et al., Third-Party Financing of Commercial Litigation, 24 IN-HOUSE LITIGATOR,
no. 4, 2010, at 1, 7.
25 See Andrew Hananel & David Staubitz, Current Development, The Ethics of Law Loans in the PostRancman Era, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 795, 800 (2004). Hananel and Staubitz refer to this concept as a “law
loan.” Id. The concept of the “law loan” has since evolved into various complex financial strategies of
investing in lawsuits by uninterested third parties, i.e., third-party litigation financing. See Geoffrey J.
Lysaught & D. Scott Hazelgrove, Economic Implications of Third-Party Litigation Financing on the U.S. Civil
Justice System, 8 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 645, 648 (2012).
26 Jason Lyon, Comment, Revolution in Progress: Third-Party Funding of American Litigation, 58
UCLA L. REV. 571, 573–74 (2010).
27 Id. at 574. The other costs include court costs, discovery costs, etc., which arise from litigating a claim
in court.
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to cover the costs of litigation while their lawsuits are pending.28 In syndicated
lawsuits, plaintiffs solicit individual lenders to invest in litigation; in exchange,
the lender will share proportionately in any proceeds resulting from the
lawsuit.29 In both of these types of third-party litigation financing, the plaintiff
will only have to repay the lender if the financed litigation is successful.30
Third-party litigation financing has continued to evolve in the United
States. The most recent trend with regard to third-party litigation financing
involves the formation of large litigation finance corporations that invest in a
corporate plaintiff’s lawsuit in exchange for a share of the eventual recovery.31
Although the practice of large corporations investing in litigation began in
Australia and the United Kingdom, it has subsequently moved to the United
States, where corporate litigation financing activity has surpassed that of
similar activity in other countries.32
The differences between third-party financing of commercial litigation and
other forms of third-party litigation investment, such as lawsuit syndication
and presettlement funding, are twofold. The first difference is the manner in
which the investors get their return. The second difference is the amount of
money the third-party funders typically invest and the potential rewards from
investment.
In the lawsuit syndication and presettlement funding context, the
investment deal is normally structured as a loan that does not require
repayment unless the plaintiff is successful.33 If the plaintiff recovers damages,
the investor gets its loan repaid while also receiving a set percentage of interest

28

See STEVEN GARBER, ALTERNATIVE LITIGATION FINANCING IN THE UNITED STATES: ISSUES, KNOWNS,

AND UNKNOWNS 9 (2010), available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/OP306.html.
29 See Susan Lorde Martin, Syndicated Lawsuits: Illegal Champerty or New Business Opportunity?,

30
AM. BUS. L.J. 485, 498 (1992); Daniel C. Cox, Comment, Lawsuit Syndication: An Investment Opportunity in
Legal Grievances, 35 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 153, 154–59 (1990).
30 Shepherd, supra note 12, at 593–94 (“Both of these forms of third-party litigation financing are nonrecourse loans because the plaintiff need only pay back the loan if the lawsuit succeeds.”).
31 Id. at 594; see also Rickard, supra note 6 (“In essence, [third-party litigation financing] is the practice
of hedge funds and other investment firms providing funds to plaintiffs’ lawyers in order to conduct
litigation.”).
32 Jennifer Banzaca, In Turbulent Markets, Hedge Fund Managers Turn to Litigation Funding for
Absolute, Uncorrelated Returns, HEDGE FUND L. REP., June 24, 2009, available at http://www.
juriscapitalcorp.com/images/Hedge%20Fund%20Law%20Report%20Article.pdf.
33 Shepherd, supra note 12, at 593–94.
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based on the principal loan amount.34 By contrast, in commercial-litigation
financing, the recovery is not based on the original amount invested. The
funder usually gets a lump sum calculated by a flat percentage of the damage
award or a set amount of the damage award plus a flat percentage of the
remaining recovery.35
The second difference between commercial-litigation financing and other
forms of litigation investment is that, in commercial-litigation financing done
by litigation finance companies, the funder routinely invests multimilliondollar sums for a percentage of possible billion-dollar recoveries.36 In
comparison, in presettlement funding and lawsuit syndication, the third-party
investment is generally in the thousands or tens of thousands of dollars, with
typical recoveries reaching into the hundred-thousand-dollar range.37 The
investment difference is primarily because presettlement funding and lawsuit
syndication are used in consumer civil litigation, whereas commerciallitigation financing involves investment groups that invest in large commercial
cases.38
The sheer size of the investment required in third-party financing of
commercial litigation has limited the number of financers in the industry thus
far—in the United States there appear to be only six corporations that invest
primarily in commercial litigation.39 Of these six corporations, three are
publicly traded (Burford Capital, IMF Ltd., and Juridica Investments), and of
those three publicly traded companies only Burford Capital and Juridica
Investments invest primarily in U.S. litigation.40 Both Burford and Juridica are

34 See Cox, supra note 29, at 155 (citing A Scheme to Sell Pieces of an Action, BUS. WK., May 24, 1976,
at 35, 36, which discusses a lawsuit syndication agreement where investors would receive 25% interest on
their $500,000 investment if the underlying lawsuit were successful).
35 See supra note 5 and accompanying text; see also Fisher, supra note 10 (“In Case 0409-C, Juridica
reports, the jury returned a $50 million verdict, good news for the firm since it only invested $4.3 million and
stands to gain the first $3 million of any cash settlement plus 49% of the rest.”).
36 Shepherd, supra note 12, at 594.
37 Lyon, supra note 26, at 578.
38 See Loiseau et al., supra note 24, at 7.
39 See GARBER, supra note 28, at 14–15 (stating the six corporations are ARCA Capital, Burford Capital,
Calunius Capital, IMF Ltd., Juridica Investments, and Juris Capital).
40 Lyon, supra note 26, at 578. The other three corporations, which are not publicly traded, provide little
to no public information about their investment activities and investment strategies. Therefore, most
information on the commercial litigation funders in this Comment will come from available information about
the publicly traded litigation investment companies.

RICHEY GALLEYSPROOFS

498

1/31/2014 10:48 AM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 63:489

incorporated and publicly traded in the United Kingdom.41 Additionally, both
companies manage portfolios of over $200 million of U.S. commerciallitigation investments.42 IMF Ltd. is an Australian company that invests
primarily in litigation outside the United States, but has created a U.S. venture,
Bentham Capital, to directly invest in U.S. litigation.43 In addition to
corporations that invest directly in commercial litigation, other corporations,
hedge funds, and investment banks give capital to third-party litigation funders
to broaden their portfolios and purchase interests in commercial lawsuits.44
The third-party litigation funders that invest multimillion-dollar sums in
commercial litigation will be the focus of this Comment. The funding by these
uninterested third parties is concentrated in particular cases––primarily patent
infringement and antitrust cases––to garner the largest potential profit.45 These
investments create disproportionate risk incentives for plaintiffs and
defendants and disadvantage defendants in litigation, causing a multitude of
problems that will be discussed throughout this Comment.46 Moreover, there
are lingering questions as to the validity of these agreements under the
doctrines of maintenance and champerty since no third-party litigation
financing agreement in a commercial lawsuit has ever been challenged in
court.47 The next portion of this Comment will discuss in detail why some
commentators favor third-party litigation financing, and then move on to
address the problems that third-party litigation financing creates in practice.
B. Arguments in Favor of Third-Party Litigation Financing
Many commentators have debated the validity and desirability of thirdparty litigation financing agreements. Proponents of third-party litigation
41 About Juridica, JURIDICA INVS. LTD., http://www.juridicainvestments.com/about-juridica.aspx (last
visited Dec. 14, 2013); Structure, BURFORD, http://www.burfordcapital.com/who-we-are/structure/ (last visited
Dec. 14, 2013).
42 Alden, supra note 3.
43 See IMF (AUSTL.) LTD., 2012 ANNUAL REPORT 4 (2012), available at http://www.imf.com.au/docs/
default-source/site-documents/imf-10091_ar-2012_v13.pdf. However, no investment information is available
for Bentham Capital. According to the Chairman of IMF Ltd.’s review in the 2012 Annual Report, Bentham
Capital will have invested in three lawsuits by its first anniversary. See id.
44 See Barrett, supra note 4, at 42 (stating Buford Capital has received investments from sources such as
“Invesco UK, Reservoir Capital Group, and Scottish Widows Investment Partnership”); Ho, supra note 2
(“Burford [Capital] raises capital from hedge funds, private equity funds and other institutional backers, then
lends that money to people in cases that appear to have a good chance of reaping major rewards, either through
a settlement, judgment or jury verdict.”).
45 O’Connell, supra note 18.
46 See infra Part III.
47 See O’Connell, supra note 18.
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financing argue primarily that it provides access to justice for plaintiffs who
otherwise could not resolve legal disputes because of the costs of litigation.48
Financing agreements that give plaintiffs their day in court are viewed as
socially desirable because they allow for third-party litigation financing
companies to finance low-income plaintiffs or businesses with insufficient
revenues or limited financial resources who could not provide for their own
legal claims.49 If these types of plaintiffs are unable to bring their meritorious
claims due to the cost barriers of litigation, suboptimal deterrence of wrongful
behavior may result.50 Third-party litigation financing can help provide access
to courts for plaintiffs with limited financial resources because it allows the
plaintiffs to bring their meritorious claims without having to fund the high cost
of litigation themselves, “redistributing the cost burdens of litigation while
promoting access to justice.”51
Another argument in support of third-party litigation financing is that risk
averse plaintiffs are often unwilling to pursue legal claims even if they can
afford litigation costs because of the indefinite nature of legal outcomes and
damage awards, which lowers the expected value of bringing a lawsuit.52
When the expected value of a legal claim dips below the expected cost of
adjudicating that claim, a plaintiff is unlikely to bring the claim even if it is
meritorious, resulting in inadequate deterrence of wrongful conduct.53 Thirdparty litigation financing, it is argued, can reduce these undesired results of
inadequate deterrence by spreading the risk and cost of a lawsuit between
multiple parties, thus encouraging plaintiffs to adjudicate their claims.54
C. Problems Caused by Third-Party Litigation Financing in Practice
Despite the social benefits that proponents claim third-party litigation
financing can create, there are a multitude of problems that result when the use
48 See Susan Lorde Martin, Litigation Financing: Another Subprime Industry That Has a Place in the
United States Market, 53 VILL. L. REV. 83, 114 (2008); Douglas R. Richmond, Other People’s Money: The
Ethics of Litigation Funding, 56 MERCER L. REV. 649, 681 (2005); Lyon, supra note 26, at 609.
49 Cf. Shepherd, supra note 12, at 598 (advocating for contingency fee arrangements).
50 See, e.g., Paul H. Rubin & Joanna M. Shepherd, The Demographics of Tort Reform, 4 REV. L. &
ECON. 591, 595–96 (2008) (finding that there is less deterrence of wrongful behavior directed toward lower
income groups that usually cannot afford the costs of litigation). The types of activities can range from a
wrong to an individual plaintiff to wrongs perpetrated against corporate defendants who may not be in the
financial position necessary to fund their own litigation.
51 Lyon, supra note 26, at 609.
52 Abrams & Chen, supra note 15, at 3.
53 See Shepherd, supra note 12, at 598–99.
54 Id. at 599.
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of third-party financing becomes widespread. The first problem caused by the
growth of lawsuit financing is that it results in more litigation.55 This problem
is created because lawsuits that would not normally be pursued due to the
prohibitive costs and risks are now being filed because the costs and risks are
shared with third-party funders.56 A 2012 study of third-party litigation
financing in Australia demonstrated that increased court congestion results
from the development of third-party litigation financing.57 The Australian
study found that in jurisdictions where a large third-party litigation firm
operated, the lawsuits were more drawn out, creating backlogs in the courts’
ability to hear cases.58 This increase in the number and length of lawsuits may
ultimately result in an increase in the amount of court expenditures by both
parties in jurisdictions where third-party litigation financing is legal.59
A second problem caused by third-party litigation financing is that it
encourages parties to file frivolous claims.60 Third-party financing permits
plaintiffs to off-load risk onto third-party funders, which could allow plaintiffs
to test nonmeritorious claims.61 Further, because third-party litigation
financing companies are broadly invested in multiple claims and well
capitalized in those investments, they can more easily shoulder the risk of a
nonmeritorious claim because that risk can be spread over the broader portfolio
of lawsuit investment.62 The study of third-party litigation investment in
Australia found that over time there was a growing spread between maximum
profits and maximum losses, making longer cases riskier.63 Despite this, there
is still a high likelihood that third-party litigation funders are investing in the
pursuit of nonmeritorious claims because the risk can be spread out among
multiple investors.64
55

Paul H. Rubin, Third-Party Financing of Litigation, 38 N. KY. L. REV. 673, 677 (2011).
See id.
57 Abrams & Chen, supra note 15, at 31.
58 See id. at 26, 31.
59 Id. at 31.
60 BEISNER ET AL., supra note 16, at 5.
61 See id. at 6 (“[T]hird-party funding companies are able to mitigate their downside risk in two ways:
they can spread the risk of any particular case over their entire portfolio of cases, and they can spread the risk
among their investors.”).
62 See id.
63 See Abrams & Chen, supra note 15, at 15.
64 See id. at 5–6. The third-party litigation financing industry in Australia is much more developed than
its U.S. counterpart, and as a result, there are more investors for which to spread the risk and thus an increase
in the volume of frivolous or questionable claims. See U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, THIRD PARTY
FINANCING: ETHICAL & LEGAL RAMIFICATIONS IN COLLECTIVE ACTIONS 10–11 (2009), available at
http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/sites/default/files/images2/stories/documents/pdf/research/thirdpartyfi
56
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A third problem with third-party litigation financing is that it removes
plaintiffs’ incentives to settle, prolonging litigation and increasing the value of
settlements.65 Litigants will likely reject any settlement that is below the
amount suggested by a third-party financing arrangement because they must
recover enough money from a settlement in order to ensure recovery for both
the third-party funder and themselves.66 For example, if a funder invests
$2 million in a litigation claim in exchange for 40% of any recovery, the
funder will set a settlement floor of at least $5 million.67 It is likely a funder
would require the settlement to be greater than $5 million so that it could
generate some sort of return on the investment.68 As a result, this creates a
disincentive for the litigant to accept what would otherwise be a fair settlement
agreement had there not been the presence of a third-party litigation funder.69
The problems caused by third-party litigation financing in practice are
threefold: it (1) increases the amount of litigation, (2) causes the filing of more
frivolous lawsuits, and (3) results in larger average settlement amounts. These
problems are only magnified considering the types of cases that third-party
litigation funders in the United States are apt to invest in.70 Third-party
litigation funders absorb plaintiffs’ risks by investing significant amounts in
lawsuits and then diversify their own downside risk by having a large portfolio
of investments.71 The result is a distortion of both the risk and cost barriers to
litigation.

nancingeurope.pdf. Investment in frivolous lawsuits could also become a problem in the United States if the
third-party litigation financing industry continues to grow unrestrained.
65 BEISNER ET AL., supra note 16, at 6.
66 See Rancman v. Interim Settlement Funding Corp., 99 Ohio St. 3d 121, 2003-Ohio-2721, 789 N.E.2d
217, at ¶¶ 15–17 (noting that the amount the plaintiff-appellant owed to litigation financiers was an “absolute
disincentive” to settle at a lesser amount); see also Loiseau et al., supra note 24, at 8 (“Once a plaintiff has
commenced a lawsuit with the backing of an investor, critics contend that plaintiffs will be more likely to
demand a higher settlement than they might otherwise be willing to accept because they have to pay a
percentage of the recovery to the investor.”).
67 See Loiseau et al., supra note 24, at 8 (“[I]nvestors may demand that the plaintiffs they support only
accept above a certain threshold in any settlement such that the investor’s costs are covered.”). If the funder
received 40% of $5 million, it would recover $2 million, allowing it to break even.
68 See id.
69 See BEISNER ET AL., supra note 16, at 6.
70 See infra Part III.
71 See BEISNER ET AL., supra note 16, at 6.
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II. MAINTENANCE AND CHAMPERTY
Two historic legal barriers to third-party litigation financing agreements are
the common-law doctrines of maintenance and champerty, which forbid
outside involvement in litigation.72 The doctrines of maintenance and
champerty are applicable in some jurisdictions in the United States, but they
are useless or completely outlawed in others.73 The variation in treatment of
the doctrines has resulted in the inconsistent presence of third-party litigation
financing in different states.74 This Part addresses the historical context in
which maintenance and champerty arose (section A) and then examines the
federal treatment of the doctrines (section B) and three different state
approaches to enforcing the doctrines (section B.1). This Part then moves on to
discuss the issues that are caused by the differing treatments of maintenance
and champerty in various jurisdictions and the disproportionate effect these
differing treatments have on third-party litigation financing investment (section
B.2). Ultimately this Part concludes that the doctrines of maintenance and
champerty should be replaced with new mechanisms to regulate third-party
litigation financing because the unequal treatment of the doctrines by differing
jurisdictions has created funding havens that result in judicial inequality for
defendants.
A. Historical Treatment of Maintenance and Champerty
Historically, third-party litigation financing was prohibited by the commonlaw doctrines of maintenance and champerty. Maintenance is defined as “the
action of wrongfully aiding and abetting litigation; spec. sustentation of a suit
or suitor at law by a party who has no interest in the proceedings.”75
Champerty is a particular type of maintenance76 and is defined as an
“agreement to divide litigation proceeds between the owner of the litigated
claim and a party unrelated to the lawsuit who supports or helps enforce the

72

Lyon, supra note 26, at 579.
See Maya Steinitz, Whose Claim Is This Anyway? Third-Party Litigation Funding, 95 MINN. L. REV.
1268, 1289–90 (2011); Lyon, supra note 26, at 583 (stating that “thirty-two states and the District of Columbia
still retain either statutes or intact precedents prohibiting champerty”).
74 See Banzaca, supra note 32 (suggesting that third-party litigation funders attempt to avoid investing in
lawsuits in states where there are strict maintenance and champerty laws on the books).
75 Lyon, supra note 26, at 579 (quoting OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 226 (2d ed. 1989)) (internal
quotation mark omitted).
76 14 AM. JUR. 2D Champerty, Maintenance, and Barratry § 1 (2009). See generally id. §§ 1–15
(discussing champerty and maintenance more expansively).
73
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claim.”77 More critically, the doctrine of champerty outlaws “an agreement
between an officious intermeddler in a lawsuit and a litigant by which the
intermeddler helps pursue the litigant’s claim as consideration for receiving
part of any judgment proceeds.”78 These doctrines “were developed at common
law to prevent officious intermeddlers from stirring up strife and contention by
vexatious and speculative litigation which would disturb the peace of society,
lead to corrupt practices, and prevent the remedial process of law.”79
Maintenance and champerty have their foundations in the common law and
were introduced during the Medieval period in England.80 In medieval
England, litigation was viewed as, “at best[,] a necessary evil,” and the
prevailing view was that litigation was something that should be avoided at all
costs.81 It was seen as quarrelsome and unchristian82 and was primarily brought
to challenge the right or title to land.83 Litigants would sue for property rights,
which they usually did not possess, and seek aid from third parties who had the
legal or financial ability to overwhelm courts.84 These litigants backed by third
parties were often able to obtain a successful verdict, allowing them to gain
title to land in which they did not possess any preexisting rights.85 In exchange
for support, the litigant would deed a portion of the disputed land to the third
party, increasing the third party’s power under the English feudal system.86 As
a result of these distortions of justice, legislatures responded by prohibiting
uninterested third parties from participating in litigation through the doctrines
of maintenance and champerty.87

77

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 262 (9th ed. 2009).
Steinitz, supra note 73, at 1286–87 (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 262 (9th ed. 2009)).
79 14 AM. JUR. 2D Champerty, Maintenance, and Barratry § 1 (2009).
80 See Max Radin, Maintenance by Champerty, 24 CALIF. L. REV. 48, 65 (1935).
81 Id. at 68.
82 Id. at 58.
83 See Steinitz, supra note 73, at 1287.
84 See id.
85 See id. (“‘[S]mall men’ transferred their rights of action in property disputes to ‘great men’ in order to
get the great men’s support at law. Because the legal establishment was weak at the time, the great men could
overwhelm the court, thus enabling the little man to get his land claim and the great men to get their share. In
other words, champerty was a means by which great men increased their power at the expense of the courts of
justice.” (quoting William R. Long, Champerty and Contingent Fees III, DR. BILL LONG.COM (Dec. 14, 2005),
http://www.drbilllong.com/LegalHistoryII/ChampertyIII.html)).
86 See Radin, supra note 80, at 60–61.
87 See Steinitz, supra note 73, at 1287.
78
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B. Maintenance and Champerty in the United States
Due to the English common law system, the legal concepts of maintenance
and champerty made their way into American jurisprudence.88 During the
middle of the nineteenth century, the validity of the doctrines were called into
question in the United States. 89 Many in the legal community did not think that
maintenance and champerty were helpful in preventing frivolous lawsuits and
believed that the doctrines were inhibiting access to justice.90 Despite this
criticism, maintenance and champerty remained in effect to bar lawyers from
soliciting business, to stop uninterested third parties from paying for litigation,
and to prevent lawyers from entering into contingency fee arrangements with
clients.91
More probing of maintenance and champerty arose during the middle of the
twentieth century because of the existing social struggle for civil rights.92
Litigation was seen as an avenue to advance social change.93 Critics pointed to
the necessity of relaxed restrictions, arguing these doctrines were invoked to
disadvantage some of the American populace.94 As a result, the Supreme Court
relaxed the doctrines of maintenance and champerty as they applied to
88

Lyon, supra note 26, at 581.
See Radin, supra note 80, at 68, 70.
90 See id. The New York Code of Civil Procedure of 1848 allowed the assignment of civil actions, which
“gave the assignee,—the indubitably champertous assignee,—a recognition and a standing.” Id. at 68. Radin
then goes on to argue that “[t]here is no necessary and inevitable connection between improper litigation, hard
bargains[,] and solicitation on the one hand and the acquisition by a third party of an interest in a litigated case,
on the other,” and that the laws of champerty and maintenance are not useful in the American legal system. Id.
at 72.
91 See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 423 & n.7 (1963) (plurality opinion); see also Lyon, supra note
26, at 582.
92 See Lyon, supra note 26, at 582.
93 See generally Stephen C. Yeazell, Brown, the Civil Rights Movement, and the Silent Litigation
Revolution, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1975, 2000–03 (2004) (explaining that the culture of the civil rights movement
valued civil litigation as an “instrument of social change”).
94 See Comment, The South’s Amended Barratry Laws: An Attempt to End Group Pressure Through the
Courts, 72 YALE L.J. 1613, 1613 (1963).
89

In the middle 1950’s seven southern states suddenly discovered a need to reinvigorate and extend
existing champerty, maintenance and solicitation rules. The flurry of legislation came on the
heels of the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of Education in which five civil rights
organizations appeared as amicus curiae. The two events were not unconnected. The action of the
legislatures was a vigorous political response to the success of these organizations before the
courts.
Id. (footnotes omitted). The civil rights organizations had financed some of the litigation, and in turn, the state
legislatures wanted to block this support of civil rights litigation by using the doctrines of maintenance and
champerty. See id. at 1615–22.
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nonprofit organizations.95 In NAACP v. Button, the Supreme Court held that an
organization’s solicitation of prospective litigants for the purpose of furthering
civil-rights objectives comes within the First Amendment right “to engage in
association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas.”96 This holding applied to
nonprofit organizations where “litigation is not a technique of resolving private
differences,” but “a form of political expression” and “political association.”97
The Court found that the solicitation of prospective litigants is entitled to First
Amendment protection and that the “government may regulate in the area only
with narrow specificity.”98 However, the holding in Button did not eliminate
the doctrines of maintenance and champerty.99 The Court subsequently upheld
the rights of states to regulate conduct under the doctrines in Ohralik v. Ohio
State Bar Association.100 The Court held that conduct as it relates to third-party
participation in lawsuits “is subject to regulation in furtherance of important
state interests.”101
1. States’ Treatment of Maintenance and Champerty
The Court’s holding in Ohralik has resulted in significant variation in
states’ treatment of the law regulating third-party conduct under maintenance
and champerty. Currently twenty-seven states and the District of Columbia
explicitly permit champerty.102 Sixteen of the twenty-seven states that permit
champerty mention investment in a stranger’s lawsuit by contract as an
accepted form of maintenance.103
The varying treatment of maintenance and champerty is demonstrated
through the judicial application of the doctrines. For example, the South
Carolina Supreme Court considered the issue of champerty in Osprey, Inc. v.
Cabana Ltd. Partnership.104 The issue in the case pertained to a contract for an
interest in a lawsuit, where the party that purchased the interest was considered
95

See Button, 371 U.S. at 428–29 (plurality opinion).
Id. at 430 (quoting NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
97 Id. at 429, 431.
98 See id. at 433.
99 See Lyon, supra note 26, at 588–89.
100 See 436 U.S. 447, 459 (1978).
101 See id.
102 GARBER, supra note 28, at 18.
103 See id. (“Of the twenty-eight states [including Washington, D.C.] that permit maintenance in some
form, sixteen explicitly permit maintenance for profit.” (quoting Anthony J. Sebok, The Inauthentic Claim, 64
VAND. L. REV. 61, 107 (2011)) (internal quotation mark omitted)).
104 532 S.E.2d 269 (S.C. 2000).
96
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by the court to be an uninterested third party.105 The lawsuit in question was
settled, and the party that purchased an interest in the lawsuit sued to enforce
its rights under the contract.106 The party who originally sold the interest in its
lawsuit moved to dismiss the case on the grounds that the agreement was
champertous and unenforceable on its face.107 The court held that the doctrine
of champerty was abolished as a defense to the enforcement of an agreement
because “it no longer is required to prevent the evils traditionally associated
with the doctrine as it developed in medieval times.”108 The court was
“convinced that other well-developed principles of law can more effectively
accomplish the goals of preventing speculation in groundless lawsuits and the
filing of frivolous suits than dated notions of champerty.”109
Similarly, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts abolished the use
of maintenance and champerty in the case of Saladini v. Righellis.110 In that
case, Saladini agreed to advance funds to Righellis to pursue litigation in
exchange for part of the recovery.111 Righellis eventually settled the dispute
but did not split the recovery with Saladini.112 Saladini sued for the contracted
amount of the recovery that she was due,113 and the court ruled in her favor,
stating that it was “no longer . . . persuaded that the champerty doctrine is
needed to protect against the evils once feared: speculation in lawsuits, the
bringing of frivolous lawsuits, or financial overreaching by a party of superior
bargaining position.”114
In contrast, the Minnesota Court of Appeals in Johnson v. Wright
invalidated a litigation loan agreement where the lender was an uninterested
third party and had contracted to recover a portion of the lawsuit proceeds.115
The court held that “an agreement in which [a funder] ha[s] no interest

105

See id. at 271.
Id. at 271–72.
107 Id. at 272.
108 Id. at 279.
109 Id. at 277. The court’s examples of other principles of law that would replace champerty in addressing
speculation in groundless and frivolous litigation include the South Carolina Rules of Professional Conduct,
which provide for sanctions against attorneys who bring frivolous litigation, and the contract doctrines of
“unconscionability, duress, and good faith [which] establish standards of fair dealing between opposing
parties.” Id.
110 687 N.E.2d 1224, 1224 (Mass. 1997).
111 Id. at 1224–25.
112 Id. at 1225.
113 Id.
114 Id. at 1224, 1226.
115 682 N.W.2d 671, 674 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004).
106
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otherwise, and when he is in no way related to the party he aids, is
champertous and void as against public policy.”116 The court in Johnson
expressly declined to follow Saladini and Osprey, opining that there was no
reason “to abandon the champerty doctrine simply because a few states have
chosen to do so.”117 Minnesota is not the only state that continues to uphold
champerty and maintenance laws; Indiana and Pennsylvania also continue to
recognize champerty and maintenance as a defense that invalidates financing
agreements between litigants and uninterested third parties.118
A third approach taken by states that have addressed champerty and
maintenance strikes a middle ground. The doctrines are not abolished, but they
are applied very reluctantly. In New York, champerty laws prohibit a party
from acquiring an interest in any legal claim “with the intent and for the
purpose of bringing an action or proceeding thereon.”119 The New York Court
of Appeals has stated, “in order to constitute champertous conduct in the
acquisition of rights . . . , the foundational intent to sue on that claim must at
least have been the primary purpose for, if not the sole motivation behind,
entering into the transaction.”120 This means that unless the facts of the case
overwhelmingly evidence that the acquisition of rights to a claim was for the
purpose of bringing a lawsuit for profit, champerty will not be recognized in
New York.121
2. Issues with the Variation in States’ Treatment of Maintenance and
Champerty
Despite the split among courts on the doctrines of maintenance, champerty,
and the permissibility of litigation financing agreements, no court has

116

Id. at 678.
Id. at 679–80.
118 See, e.g., Midtown Chiropractic v. Ill. Farmers Ins. Co., 847 N.E.2d 942, 947 (Ind. 2006) (disallowing
the “assignment of proceeds from a personal injury claim” because the assignment was champertous);
Fleetwood Area Sch. Dist. v. Berks Cnty. Bd. of Assessment Appeals, 821 A.2d 1268, 1273 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
2003) (“‘[T]he activity of champerty has long been considered repugnant to public policy against profiteering
and speculating in litigation . . . .’ Moreover, . . . the doctrine of champerty continues to be viable in this
Commonwealth and can be raised as a defense.” (citation omitted) (quoting Clark v. Cambria Cnty. Bd. of
Assessment Appeals, 747 A.2d 1242, 1245–46 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2000))).
119 N.Y. JUD. LAW § 489 (McKinney 2005).
120 Bluebird Partners, v. First Fid. Bank, N.A., 731 N.E.2d 581, 587 (N.Y. 2000).
121 See id. at 586–88 (indicating that the doctrine of champerty could be used to invalidate a litigation
financing agreement where the sole purpose of the third-party funding is to enable the plaintiff to pursue the
cause of action).
117
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considered the legality of third-party financing of commercial litigation.122
Third-party litigation funders consider the existing maintenance and champerty
laws when looking for investments and avoid jurisdictions with strict
maintenance and champerty rulings on the books.123 Some commentators argue
that, in the American legal system, litigation should be encouraged and barriers
to litigation should be removed, rendering maintenance and champerty
obsolete.124 The varying treatment of maintenance and champerty makes states
that have eliminated the doctrines susceptible to lawsuits funded by
uninterested third-parties.125 If all states do not reject maintenance and
champerty, inequality in the ability for potential plaintiffs to get third-party
financing may result.
Overall, there appears to be a trend toward removing maintenance and
champerty as barriers to third-party litigation financing.126 Because
maintenance and champerty are, by and large, no longer useful apparatuses for
regulating third-party financing due to the imbalanced administration of the
doctrines from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, they should be completely
eliminated. A new solution regulating third-party litigation financing needs to
replace these outdated doctrines to level the playing field for defendants while
still protecting plaintiffs from predatory litigation funders.
III. THE RISK IMBALANCES CREATED BY THE INTERACTION OF THIRD-PARTY
LITIGATION FINANCING AND TREBLE DAMAGES
Third-party funders have invested much of their litigation portfolios in
cases that include the possibility of recovering treble damages.127 The
enormous recoveries that result from treble damages create significant risk
imbalances between plaintiffs and defendants.128 Plaintiffs are given a relative
bargaining advantage over defendants because of asymmetric litigation costs
122

Shepherd, supra note 12, at 594–95.
Banzaca, supra note 32.
124 Lyon, supra note 26, at 589.
125 See Banzaca, supra note 32. Discussing champerty and how it effects the company’s investment
decisions, Juridica CEO Richard Fields said, “There are a few states where it’s crystal clear that [champerty is]
not a problem, like New Jersey. Most states have cases on the books and in some states it’s more of a risk than
others. There are only a few states where champerty gives a defendant a defense.” Id. (internal quotation mark
omitted).
126 See Lyon, supra note 26, at 588 (“A series of Supreme Court cases in the 1960s, ’70s and ’80s that
struck down state regulation of various aspects of the legal industry enshrined in American jurisprudence the
shift in popular attitudes about litigation.”).
127 See infra Part III.B.
128 See Shepherd, supra note 12, at 603–07.
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that result from the existence of these risk imbalances.129 The disadvantages
defendants face are only exacerbated when third-party litigation financing
comes into the fold.130 This Part explains the risk imbalances that exist as a
result of treble damage statutes (section A), the attractiveness of cases with
potential treble damages to third-party investors (section B), and the large
litigation advantages that result for plaintiffs when treble damages and thirdparty financing intertwine (section C).
A. Existing Risk Imbalances Caused by Treble Damage Statutes
Treble damages are a signature of American law and are statutorily
imposed in many types of cases, most notably patent infringement131 and
antitrust actions.132 The existence of these types of damages has resulted in a
majority of commercial third-party litigation investment being channeled into
patent infringement and antitrust litigation.133 Treble damages means that “any
verdict rendered . . . upon which a judgment will be entered by the court, will
be multiplied by three.”134 The statutory structure of treble damages was
created to deter potential wrongdoers, provide incentives for plaintiffs to bring
lawsuits, and fully compensate the victims of the conduct associated with the
treble damage statutes.135 The effectiveness of treble damages has been the
subject of much debate.136 Despite this debate, treble damage statutes often
cause plaintiffs to recover substantial damages.137
129

See infra Part III.A.
See infra Part III.A.
131 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006 & Supp. V 2011) (“Upon finding for the claimant . . . . the court may increase
the damages up to three times the amount found or assessed.”).
132 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2012) (“[A]ny person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of
anything forbidden in the antitrust laws . . . shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained . . . .”).
133 See O’Connell, supra note 18.
134 Lowry v. Tile, Mantel & Grate Ass’n of Cal., 106 F. 38, 46 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1900), aff’d sub nom.
W.W. Montague & Co. v. Lowry, 115 F. 27 (9th Cir. 1902), aff’d, 193 U.S. 38 (1904).
135 Leon B. Greenfield & David F. Olsky, Treble Damages: To What Purpose and to What Effect?,
WILMERHALE 5 (Feb. 2, 2007), http://www.wilmerhale.com/files/Publication/dc8754ff-a713-459e-80aaf8e5cf50cf12/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/98011e52-2e46-41c1-ae26-019292035734/Treble%20
Damages%20Article_%20BIICL%20conference.pdf (discussing the reasons for treble damages).
136 See, e.g., William Breit & Kenneth G. Elzinga, Private Antitrust Enforcement: The New Learning, 28
J.L. & ECON. 405, 430–35 (1985) (discussing various critiques of treble damages); Robert H. Lande, Are
Antitrust “Treble” Damages Really Single Damages?, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 115, 118–19 (1993) (“[W]hen viewed
correctly, [treble] antitrust damages awards are approximately equal to, or less than, the actual damages caused
by antitrust violations.”); Michael J. Meurer, Controlling Opportunistic and Anti-competitive Intellectual
Property Litigation, 44 B.C. L. REV. 509, 539 (2003) (“Trebled antitrust damages are a potent deterrent of
anticompetitive activity, but in practice antitrust does little to control socially harmful IP litigation because its
reach is very limited; it does not apply to opportunistic litigation and applies only to a subset of
anticompetitive litigation.”); Steven C. Salop & Lawrence J. White, Economic Analysis of Private Antitrust
130
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Patent infringement lawsuits can result in treble damages,138 and the costs
of litigation for these types of cases can be significant. In 2011, in patent
infringement cases with $1 million to $25 million at risk, the average cost of
litigation for each party was $2.5 million, while the average litigation cost for
each party in cases with more than $25 million at risk was $5 million.139
Defendants are disadvantaged in these cases because they bear a higher burden
of proof than plaintiffs. Defendants must prove that a patent is invalid by clear
and convincing evidence, while plaintiffs only have to show that the defendant
infringed on the patent by a preponderance of the evidence.140 “Discovery
burdens are [also] unequal and mostly one-sided in favor of the patent troll
who commonly has few documents beyond the patent and prosecution
history.”141 Furthermore, if the defendant is found to have willfully infringed
on a patent, the defendant may have to pay treble damages and attorneys’
fees.142 This cost can be substantial: the median damage award for patent
infringement lawsuits in 2012 was $9.5 million, with multiple juries awarding
damages of over $1 billion.143 The low burden of proof and large damage
awards result in a bargaining advantage for plaintiffs and gives plaintiffs an

Litigation, 74 GEO. L.J. 1001, 1051 (1986) (arguing that eliminating treble damages for antitrust violations
would increase such violations).
137 See Shepherd, supra note 12, at 605 (discussing that if a defendant is found liable of price fixing,
“damages often exceed $1 billion”).
138 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
139 AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS’N, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 2011, at 35 (2011).
140 See Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc. v. Scimed Life Sys., Inc., 261 F.3d 1329, 1336 (Fed. Cir.
2001) (“[T]he plaintiff must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the accused device infringes one
or more claims of the patent either literally or under the doctrine of equivalents.”); U.S. Surgical Corp. v.
Ethicon, Inc., 103 F.3d 1554, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“[I]nvalidity must be proved by clear and convincing
evidence.”).
141 Christopher A. Harkins, Fending Off Paper Patents and Patent Trolls: A Novel “Cold Fusion”
Defense Because Changing Times Demand It, 17 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 407, 443 (2007).
142 35 U.S.C. § 284 (“[A] court may increase the damages up to three times the amount found or
assessed.”); 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2006) (“The court in exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney fees to the
prevailing party.”); see also I4I Ltd. P’ship v. Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831, 858 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (discussing
a court’s discretion to award treble damages upon a finding of willful infringement), aff’d, 131 S. Ct. 2238
(2011); Epcon Gas Sys., Inc. v. Bauer Compressors, Inc., 279 F.3d 1022, 1034 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (discussing
how a court may award reasonable attorneys’ fees in exceptional cases, such as where there is a showing of
willful infringement).
143 CHRIS BARRY ET AL., PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, 2013 PATENT LITIGATION STUDY: BIG CASES
MAKE HEADLINES, WHILE PATENT CASES PROLIFERATE 3, 7–8 (2013), available at http://www.pwc.com/en_
US/us/forensic-services/publications/assets/2013-patent-litigation-study.pdf (“But [in 2012] alone, three cases,
tried before juries in separate districts, resulted in awards of $1 billion or greater: Monsanto v. DuPont, Apple
v. Samsung, and Carnegie Mellon University v. Marvell.”). However, “[t]he largest historical awards have
rarely been upheld”: “by mid-2013, two of the three blockbusters from 2012 were significantly reduced or
settled, with the other still pending appeals.” Id. at 8.
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incentive to bring lawsuits regardless of their merit.144 In contrast, the
defendant is faced with spending enormous amounts of money to undertake
any portion of the litigation process, even if the defendant does not think it is
infringing on the patent.145 This bargaining advantage can force defendants to
agree to larger settlements than they would have accepted without the threat of
treble damages and high litigation costs.146
Similarly in antitrust cases, plaintiffs have a bargaining advantage over
defendants. Damages are automatically trebled in these cases,147 resulting in
large damage awards often exceeding $1 billion.148 Additionally, defendants
can face joint and several liability with no right to contribution from coconspirators if the plaintiff is successful.149 A successful plaintiff is also
entitled to recover reasonable attorneys’ fees from the defendant.150 These
factors further increase the potential damage award and give plaintiffs an
incredible bargaining advantage in settlement negotiations.151 Just like in
patent infringement lawsuits, an unsuccessful plaintiff only has to pay its cost
of litigation while an unsuccessful defendant has to pay treble damages,
attorneys’ fees for both sides, and possibly the damages of its co-conspirators
due to joint and several liability.152 Also similar to patent infringement cases,
this bargaining advantage for plaintiffs can force defendants into settling
claims for much more than a usual market would bear had there not been the
144

See Meurer, supra note 136, at 512–15.
See id.
146 See id. at 512–16.
147 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2012).
148 See Shepherd, supra note 12, at 605 (citing Antitrust Damage Allocation: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Monopolies & Commercial Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 141 (1983)
(prepared statement of Robert P. Taylor, Attorney, Pillsbury, Madison & Sutro); In re Visa
Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig., 297 F. Supp. 2d 503, 506–07 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (approving a settlement in
excess of $3 billion), aff’d sub nom. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 396 F.3d 96 (2d Cir. 2005)).
149 See id. at 606 (“As a result, a liable conspirator who has paid the trebled value of the entire cartel’s
total overcharges cannot sue its co-conspirators to pay their fair share.”); Greenfield & Olsky, supra note 135,
at 2–3 (discussing antitrust treble damages).
150 15 U.S.C. § 15(a).
151 Shepherd, supra note 12, at 607.
152 See id. at 605; see also JURIDICA INVS. LTD., ANNUAL REPORT & ACCOUNTS 2008, at 9 (2008),
available at http://www.juridicainvestments.com/~/media/Files/J/Juridica/pdfs/2008_Annual_Report.pdf
(“Antitrust litigation is brought in the US under the Sherman Act or the Clayton Act and carries the possibility
of statutory treble damages for the defendants. . . . The price-fixing cases are particularly attractive investment
opportunities for JIL as they are perceived to have a low risk profile and high potential damages. Civil
litigation in this arena often, but not always, follows either criminal prosecution by the US Department of
Justice or early settlement by a cartel member in exchange for giving evidence against co-conspirators. These
events help to establish liability. The multi-defendant nature of these cases increases the likelihood of pre-trial
settlements.”).
145
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threat of treble damages, litigation costs, and joint and several liability, leading
to inefficient litigation outcomes.153
B. Attractiveness of Statutory Treble Damage Cases for Third-Party Investors
The large damage awards available because of treble damage statutes in
patent infringement and antitrust cases have enticed third-party litigation
funders to devote substantial portions of their investment portfolio to these
types of lawsuits.154 For example, sixteen of the twenty-three lawsuits Juridica
Investments has invested in as of June 30, 2012 were antitrust or patent
infringement cases.155 The investment in these twenty-three lawsuits totaled
$157.1 million.156 In total, 85% of Juridica’s litigation investment funds were
committed to antitrust and patent infringement lawsuits, with $96.9 million
committed to six antitrust cases and $37.3 million committed to ten patent
infringement cases.157
Burford Capital, another third-party litigation funder, might also have a
substantial commitment to patent infringement and antitrust lawsuits.158
Although Burford Capital does not specifically report what lawsuits it is
currently invested in, it has stated that it plans to invest in “cases with big
potential rewards. These could include patent thefts, antitrust proceedings or
corporate torts . . . .”159
C. Consequences of Third-Party Litigation Financing and Treble Damage
Awards
Overall, the laws underlying patent infringement and antitrust litigation––
chiefly treble damages statutes––create a risk imbalance that favors plaintiffs.
Defendants are pressured to overpay in settlement agreements because they
153

See Shepherd, supra note 12, at 607.
See O’Connell, supra note 18; see also Fisher, supra note 10 (“[Juridica CEO Richard] Fields’[s] ideal
case is where the damages are large and quantifiable, and the law favors the plaintiff, such as antitrust lawsuits
where there is no real dispute that the defendant companies engaged in some sort of concerted effort to fix
prices.”).
155 Assets Under Management, JURIDICA INVS. LTD., http://www.juridicainvestments.com/investorrelations/financialdata-and-tools/assets-under-management.aspx (last visited Dec. 14, 2013).
156 Id.
157 See id.
158 See Jason Douglas, UPDATE: Burford Capital Raises GBP80 Million in 5th AIM Float of ‘09, DOW
JONES BUSINESS NEWS, Oct. 16, 2009, available at http://www.advfn.com/news_UPDATE-Burford-CapitalRaises-GBP80-Million-In-5t_39926046.html.
159 Id.
154
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otherwise face the prospect of paying treble damages to a successful
plaintiff.160 Third-party litigation funders intensify this risk imbalance by
absorbing a majority of the plaintiff’s risk exposure by funding most of the
litigation costs.161 Third-party litigation financing encourages plaintiffs to
bring lawsuits that have exorbitant potential damage awards.162 Third-party
litigation funders are also protected from downside risk because they can
mitigate potential losses in any one case by spreading out risk over a number
of cases in their portfolios.163
The existence of a third-party funder in a lawsuit may cause the defendant
to accept an even less favorable settlement164 because the defendant knows it
faces the prospect of fighting an opposing party with extremely deep pockets.
According to Joanna Shepherd, Associate Professor at Emory University
School of Law, “[s]ettlements that are systematically larger than expected trial
outcomes otherwise dictated by the substantive law lead to overcompensation
of some plaintiffs and over-deterrence of certain behaviors.”165 This overdeterrence leads to inefficient behavior166 that could ultimately manifest in a
social cost to the population at large by stifling competition and innovation by
parties who fear potentially costly patent infringement or antitrust litigation.
Third-party litigation funders only aggravate the possible social costs by giving
plaintiffs the means to bring these lawsuits and increasing the volume of
litigation as a result.167
The intermingling of third-party litigation financing and treble damages is a
dangerous combination for defendants. This Comment’s solution looks to
avoid these inefficient outcomes and balance the litigation scales between the
opposing parties.
IV. STATES’ ATTEMPTS TO REGULATE THIRD-PARTY LITIGATION FINANCING
As third-party litigation financing has grown in the United States, a few
states have attempted to regulate the industry to provide protection to those
receiving third-party funding. This Part discusses what regulations states have
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167

See supra Part III.A.
Shepherd, supra note 12, at 595–96.
See Rubin, supra note 55, at 677, 684–85.
See id. at 677; see also BEISNER ET AL., supra note 16, at 6.
See Shepherd, supra note 12, at 609.
Id. at 610.
See id.
See Rubin, supra note 55, at 677–78.
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enacted and are attempting to enact to police the third-party litigation financing
industry (section A). This Part further addresses how these state laws fail to
adequately regulate third-party litigation financing in commercial litigation
because they focus on third-party litigation financing to individuals (section
B).
A. Current Status of State Laws Regulating Third-Party Litigation Financing
Maine, Nebraska, and Ohio168 have passed laws that attempt to put
restrictions on third-party litigation funders.169 The enacted statutes are framed
mostly to protect individual plaintiffs and apply primarily to the financing of
noncommercial civil litigation.170 These statutes provide for certain clauses and
language to be set forth in third-party litigation financing contracts with
plaintiffs.171 The three states that have enacted legislation have required
clauses that include (1) language that allows a plaintiff who signs a third-party
litigation financing contract to cancel that contract within five days of
receiving the financing if the plaintiff returns the funds, (2) language that
instructs the plaintiff to consult an attorney, (3) itemized one-time fees charged
by the funder, (4) the annual percentage rate of return that the funder will
receive on the investment, and (5) the total dollar amount to be repaid by the
plaintiff to the funder after the conclusion of the litigation.172 The Maine and
Nebraska statutes further require third-party litigation funders to register with
the state, which includes a fee, as well as to maintain a surety bond or line of
credit with the state in order to ensure the funders’ financial viability.173 The
Nebraska statute prohibits referral relationships between attorneys and funders
to avoid conflicts of interest for attorneys who are representing clients who
168 When the Ohio statute was enacted in 2008, it revived third-party lending in the state after the Ohio
Supreme Court rendered third-party financing agreements unenforceable in Rancman v. Interim Settlement
Funding Corp., 99 Ohio St. 3d 121, 2003-Ohio-2721, 789 N.E.2d 217, at ¶¶ 15–17. See Ben Hallman &
Caitlin Ginley, States Are Battleground in Drive to Regulate Lawsuit Funding, CENTER FOR PUB. INTEGRITY,
http://www.publicintegrity.org/2011/02/02/2160/states-are-battleground-drive-regulate-lawsuit-funding (last
updated May 6, 2013, 4:16 PM).
169 Maine Consumer Credit Code Legal Funding Practices, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9-A, §§ 12-101 to
-107 (2009); Nonrecourse Civil Litigation Act, NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 25-3301 to -3309 (West Supp.
2010); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1349.55 (West Supp. 2013); see Lyon, supra note 26, at 575.
170 Lyon, supra note 26, at 575 (“[T]hese statutes appear to apply primarily to loans in personal injury,
rather than commercial, suits.”).
171 See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9-A, § 12-104(2)–(7); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-3303(1); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 1349.55(B)(1)–(6).
172 See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9-A, § 12-104(2)–(3), (6); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-3303(1)(a)–(b),
(e); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1349.55(B)(1)–(2), (5).
173 See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9-A, § 12-106; NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-3307.
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may need to seek third-party litigation financing.174 The Nebraska statute also
prohibits third-party funders from accessing any information that would
normally be privileged under the attorney–client relationship or making any
decisions regarding the underlying civil action.175 The enacted state statutes
seek to minimize the ethical issues that have caused the propriety of third-party
litigation financing contracts to be questioned176 and attempt to make thirdparty litigation financing a more regulated and less issue-ridden industry.
Illinois, Kentucky, New York, and Texas have all tried to pass third-party
financing laws similar to those that are in effect in Maine, Nebraska, and
Ohio.177 Some states’ efforts to enact these laws have been met with resistance
from lobbyists for third-party litigation funders who do not want lawsuit
funding to be controlled.178 As a result Illinois, Kentucky, New York, and
Texas have been unable to enact laws regulating third-party litigation
financing.179
B. Downfalls of the Enacted Legislation Regulating Third-Party Litigation
Financing
The success of the laws enacted by Maine, Nebraska, and Ohio is
questionable at best.180 The enacted statutes and proposed bills are seen by
many to only exacerbate a growing problem in which third-party litigation
funders are now given a license to engage in deceptive and unfair business
practices to seek high returns.181 The statutes and bills have been criticized for
174

See NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-3304(1), (2).
See id. § 25-3306.
176 See GARBER, supra note 28, at 18–19 (citing various papers that critique third-party litigation
financing for causing conflicts of interest between attorneys and their clients).
177 See H.B. 412, 2011 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2011); see Hallman & Ginley, supra note 167
(discussing legislation in Illinois, New York, and Texas).
178 See Hallman & Ginley, supra note 168.
179 See id.; HB 412, KY. LEGISLATURE, http://www.lrc.ky.gov/record/11rs/HB412.htm (last visited Dec.
14, 2013) (providing legislative history of the Kentucky bill).
180 Cf. Binyamin Applebaum, Lawsuit Loans Add New Risk for the Injured, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2011, at
A1 (“To fortify its position, the industry has started volunteering to be regulated—but on its own terms. The
companies, and lawyers who support the industry, have lobbied state legislatures to establish rules like
licensing and disclosure requirements, but also to make clear that some rules, like price caps, do not apply.
Maine and Ohio passed the first such laws in 2008, followed by Nebraska . . . .”).
181 See, e.g., Editorial, Lawsuit Loan Sharks, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 24, 2010, § 1, at 16 (suggesting that a
proposed Illinois bill regulating third-party litigation financing, similar to those enacted in other states such as
Maine, Nebraska, and Ohio, that provides consumer protection and requires certain disclosures in third-party
funding contracts, “would give legal certainty to an abusive practice and put it under a light regulatory scheme
where it can flourish—spawning lawsuits galore”).
175
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failing to regulate third-party litigation financing because they only require
third-party funders to (1) use boilerplate contract language and (2) obtain a
state license to conduct their activities, making the funders appear
legitimate.182
Another inherent flaw in the enacted third-party litigation financing
regulation is that there is no limit on the percentage of a judgment or
settlement a funder can receive, nor is there a limit on the interest rate that the
funder can charge on the invested funds.183 This only encourages predatory
business practices, as funders can contract for minimum recovery amounts in
the millions and charge exorbitant interest rates on top of that.184 The proposed
legislation also fails to provide interest rate or judgment percentage recovery
protections for consumers.185 As a result, third-party litigation funders have an
incentive to engage in misleading business tactics because they can charge
extremely high interest rates on their investments, require a large percentage of
the recovery from a successful underlying lawsuit to be paid to them, or
both.186 This creates large profits for investors but provides little protection for
consumers.187 There are also no legislative measures aimed at protecting
defendants.188 Overall, although the attempts by states to police the third-party
litigation finance industry are a good starting point for regulation, they have
had no significant effect on the majority of cases involving third-party
litigation funders or the inefficiencies they cause.189

182

See id.
See Maine Consumer Credit Code Legal Funding Practices, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9-A, §§ 12-101
to -107 (2009); Nonrecourse Civil Litigation Act, NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 25-3301 to -3309 (West Supp.
2010); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1349.55 (West Supp. 2013); see also Applebaum, supra note 180 (“[Thirdparty litigation funding companies], and lawyers who support the industry, have lobbied state legislatures to
establish rules like licensing and disclosure requirements, but also to make clear that some rules, like price
caps, do not apply.”).
184 See, e.g., Fisher, supra note 10 (“In Case 0409-C, Juridica reports, the jury returned a $50 million
verdict, good news for the firm since it only invested $4.3 million and stands to gain the first $3 million of any
cash settlement plus 49% of the rest.”).
185 See Hallman & Ginley, supra note 168 (stating that the focus of the industry and its allies has been to
develop legislation that would “block caps on the interest rates the lenders can charge”); see also John
O’Brien, Ky. Lawsuit Lending Bill Irks Business Group, LEGAL NEWSLINE (Feb. 25, 2011, 1:19 PM),
http://legalnewsline.com/news/231400-ky-lawsuit-lending-bill-irks-business-group (noting that Bryan
Sunderland, vice president of public affairs of the Kentucky Chamber of Commerce, stated that the proposed
Kentucky bill did “nothing to cap the interest rates charged to customers”).
186 See O’Brien, supra note 185.
187 See id. (“Companies must charge these exorbitant rates to ensure a healthy profit, all the while
consumers suffer.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
188 See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
189 See supra Part III.B.
183
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Current legislation regulating the third-party litigation finance industry is
inadequate. This legislation needs to be expanded in order to make a
significant difference in leveling the litigation playing field and protecting
consumers. First, the regulatory scheme for third-party litigation financing
must protect all parties who receive financing, regardless of whether they are
commercial or individual plaintiffs. Second, safeguards must be added to
protect defendants from the inefficiencies that result from third-party litigation
financing.190 Part V of this Comment will provide possible solutions to
regulate the third-party litigation finance industry and address the effects of
these proposed solutions.
V. PROPOSALS TO REGULATE THIRD-PARTY LITIGATION FINANCING
As discussed in Part IV, a few states have attempted to regulate the thirdparty litigation financing industry, but overall there is no comprehensive legal
precedent for regulation.191 The states that have attempted to regulate thirdparty litigation financing have done so to protect consumers, but because these
laws do not address commercial litigation,192 they have done little to regulate
or affect the overall industry.193 Historically, maintenance and champerty
prohibited uninterested third parties from involving themselves in litigation,
but, due to the doctrines’ imbalanced application from one jurisdiction to the
next, they are no longer enough to regulate third-party litigation financing.194 A
new comprehensive regulatory scheme needs to be adopted in order to balance
the scales of justice between plaintiffs and defendants, especially in cases
where third parties fund commercial litigation. This Part argues that this
regulatory scheme should include (1) instituting caps on the recovery that
financers can receive (section A); (2) enacting registration and licensing
requirements for third-party litigation funders (section B); and (3) extending
the Maine, Nebraska, and Ohio framework to create two sets of regulations to
govern all forms of third-party litigation financing (section C).

190

See supra Part III.C (discussing the consequences of third-party litigation financing for defendants).
BEISNER ET AL., supra note 16, at 4.
192 Lyon, supra note 26, at 575.
193 See BEISNER ET AL., supra note 16, at 3–4.
194 See supra Part II.B.2 (discussing the problems with variation in jurisdictions’ treatment of
maintenance and champerty).
191
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A. Limiting the Recovery of Third-Party Litigation Funders
To help rectify the inequities caused by third-party litigation financing, this
section proposes two initial steps. First, with respect to third-party litigation
financing agreements, the outdated and mostly meaningless doctrines of
maintenance and champerty need to be abolished nationwide in order to allow
for a new regulatory scheme to be enacted on a broad scale. Second, a strict
cap on the percentage of a settlement or judgment that a third-party funder is
allowed to receive needs to be enacted. Imposing caps would still allow for
third-party financing investment, which increases access to justice,195 but
would reduce the possible return that a third-party funder could generate from
financing litigation. These caps could be similar to caps that are imposed on
contingency fee arrangements between plaintiffs and attorneys that are in
effect in a few states, including California,196 Connecticut,197 and Florida.198
A contingency fee arrangement is an alternative financing method for
clients and attorneys where an attorney is entitled to share in a portion of the
recovery from a successful lawsuit instead of collecting an hourly fee
throughout the litigation.199 The statutory caps limit the percentage of a
judgment or settlement an attorney hired on a contingency fee basis can

195

See Lyon, supra note 26, at 609.
CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6146 (West 2003). California law limits attorneys’ recovery under
contingency fee arrangements to
196

(1) Forty percent of the first fifty thousand dollars ($50,000) recovered.
(2) Thirty-three and one-third percent of the next fifty thousand dollars ($50,000) recovered.
(3) Twenty-five percent of the next five hundred thousand dollars ($500,000) recovered.
(4) Fifteen percent of any amount on which the recovery exceeds six hundred thousand dollars
($600,000).
Id.
197 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-251c (West 2013). Connecticut law limits attorneys’ recovery under
contingency fee arrangements to

(1) Thirty-three and one-third per cent of the first three hundred thousand dollars; (2) twenty-five
per cent of the next three hundred thousand dollars; (3) twenty per cent of the next three hundred
thousand dollars; (4) fifteen per cent of the next three hundred thousand dollars; and (5) ten per
cent of any amount which exceeds one million two hundred thousand dollars.
Id. § 52-251c(b).
198 R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-1.5(f)(4)(B)(i) (limiting attorneys’ recovery under contingency fee
arrangements in tort litigation to different percentages based on whether the claim is settled before an answer
is filed by the defendant, goes to a final judgment, or there is a trial solely to decide damages).
199 See Richard M. Birnholz, Comment, The Validity and Propriety of Contingent Fee Controls, 37 UCLA
L. REV. 949, 953 (1990).
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receive.200 Overall contingency fee caps have increased access to justice201 and
deterred frivolous lawsuits by incentivizing attorneys to take on cases in which
recovery (and payment to the attorney) is more likely.202 These caps attempt to
decrease the attorney’s share of the compensation203 and have been found to
cause attorneys to engage in more risk neutral behavior.204 This risk neutral
behavior may result in attorneys taking fewer contingency fee cases because
they may be unwilling to take cases where the expected outcome is not
extremely favorable.205 Further, contingency fee caps have been found to lower
the average settlement amount for two reasons: (1) attorneys invest less in
these cases due to their limited recovery, and (2) there is less pressure on
plaintiffs to seek higher settlements in order to ensure their recovery is
advantageous to both the contingency fee attorney and the plaintiff.206
If statutory caps similar to those in existence for contingency fee attorneys
were introduced for recoveries by third-party litigation financers, the same
overall effects would likely result. By limiting the contractual percentage of
any potential recovery a third-party funder could receive, these caps would
reduce the potential return on investment for funders. For example, applying
the Connecticut contingency fee caps207 to the $25 million settlement in the
DeepNines case,208 the third-party funder would only have recovered $2.66

200 See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6146(a); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-251c(b); R. REGULATING FLA.
BAR 4-1.5(f)(4)(B)(i).
201 See Lester Brickman, Contingent Fees Without Contingencies: Hamlet Without the Prince of
Denmark?, 37 UCLA L. REV. 29, 38 (1989); see also Birnholz, supra note 199, at 953 (stating that
contingency fee arrangements “make[] it possible for the poorest litigants to obtain legal representation”).
202 Birnholz, supra note 199, at 978.
203 See id.
204 Michael Cristoforo, Note, Medical-Malpractice Contingency-Fee Caps: A Big Victory for Florida’s
Voters and Tort Reformers? Maybe Not., 62 U. MIAMI L. REV. 913, 923–24 (2008).
205 See id. Cristoforo argues that contingency fee caps “reduce[] the opportunity for the attorney to
diversify risk and consequently, cause[] the attorney to be less risk-seeking or neutral” because the lawyer
receives a lower overall recovery from judgments. Id. at 924. Attorneys are then less able to take on cases that
do not have a high probability of a beneficial outcome because the losses that might result from an unfavorable
outcome cannot be made up in higher returns from the cases with probable beneficial outcomes. See id.
206 See Litigation Abuse Reform Act of 1986: Hearing on S. 2038 and S. 2046 Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 99th Cong. 271 (1987) (statement of Patricia M. Danzon, Consultant, Institute for Civil Justice, The
Rand Corporation) (concluding that, in one study, placing limits on the percentage recovery of contingency fee
attorneys had the effect of lowering the average settlement by nine percent); Birnholz, supra note 199, at 978
(“If the attorney’s percentage is smaller, a plaintiff will obtain the same net recovery from a lower overall
settlement amount. . . . [This] eases the burdens on the court system by lessening the number of cases that must
be tried.”).
207 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-251c(b) (West 2013).
208 See supra notes 6–9 and accompanying text.
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million209 instead of the $10.1 million it actually received from the
settlement.210 This would have allowed the plaintiff DeepNines to recover
$8.24 million after legal fees and payment to the third-party funder instead of
the mere $800,000 it actually recovered.211 The third-party funder in
DeepNines invested $8 million in the case and got a 126% return on its
investment,212 but if these caps were in effect, the funder would have had to
invest much less in order to see a positive return. These caps would effectively
reduce the amount funders would be willing to invest because the potential
recovery would be limited.
Additionally, third-party litigation funders would not be able to diversify
risk as easily by taking on a multitude of cases because recovery would be
limited in successful cases, making them less able to shoulder losses in riskier
cases. Funders, in order to ensure high returns, could only take on the cases
most likely to be successful and would have to limit their investment in these
cases in order to reach their investment-return targets. This would also result in
a reduction in the amount of litigation. Funders would no longer invest in
riskier cases, and the cost and risk of pursuing these claims would likely bar
many potential plaintiffs from filing lawsuits without third-party backing.
Some commentators argue that limiting the recovery of third-party litigation
funders could prevent them from investing in the riskiest and most extreme
cases—the cases where plaintiffs have the least access to justice.213 However,
this argument fails because third-party litigation funders currently do not invest
in these risky cases, as would be socially desirable; instead they invest in
lawsuits that have the highest potential of success.214
209 Based on the Connecticut cap, the third-party funder in the DeepNines case would receive 33⅓% of
the first $300,000 ($100,000), 25% of the next $300,000 ($75,000), 20% of the next $300,000 ($60,000), 15%
of the next $300,000 ($45,000), and then 10% of the remaining $23.8 million ($2.38 million), for a total of
$2.66 million. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-251c(b).
210 Rickard, supra note 6.
211 See id. This number is calculated by assuming the $10.1 million recovered by the third-party litigation
funder in the case would be reduced to $2.66 million, the maximum recovery under the cap. The remaining
$7.44 million of that recovery that originally went to the third-party litigation funder would then be added to
the plaintiff’s original $800,000 recovery in the case. See id. The portion of the $25 million settlement not
accounted for in this calculation had to be paid out in legal fees. See id.
212 See id.
213 See, for example, Lyon, supra note 26, at 591–92, which argues that third-party funding will create a
social good because “even if third-party funding is likely to produce more litigation, it is equally likely
to . . . provide greater access to justice, which is a net benefit to society.”
214 See Banzaca, supra note 32 (paraphrasing an interview with Kenneth W. Bradt, CEO of litigation
financing firm CaseFunding/Attorney Financial Services, who stated that his firm “only funds cases that have
a high likelihood of an appreciable award or settlement”); see also Abrams & Chen, supra note 15, at 14–15
(“Firms fund cases where the risk is small and where they estimate the probability of winning a successful
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Similarly, neither of the two main criticisms of attorney contingency fee
caps raises concerns in the third-party litigation financing context. First,
contingency fee caps have been criticized for reducing the quality of legal
services provided to clients because attorneys have no incentive to work hard
when they cannot receive high contingency fee recoveries.215 This criticism
does not apply in the third-party litigation financing context because an
attorney is not subject to third-party financing caps; therefore an attorney’s
incentive to render quality legal services is not reduced because the attorney is
paid an hourly fee. Second, contingency fee caps have been criticized for
restricting access to the legal system.216 This criticism also seems inapplicable
to third-party litigation financing because a majority of third-party litigation
funders’ investments are in patent infringement and antitrust lawsuits where
access to justice is not a major issue.217
In summary, introducing caps on the percentage of a judgment or
settlement a third-party litigation funder can receive would reduce the
inefficiencies that are created by third-party litigation financing. Plaintiffs
would likely receive less funding from third-party funders, and cost barriers
would prevent a considerable number of nonmeritorious lawsuits from being
brought in the first place. This decrease in investment would reduce the risk
imbalances that third-party funders create by providing endless financing to
plaintiffs who might receive large damage awards. The pressure on plaintiffs to
settle for large dollar amounts in order to ensure they are duly compensated
would decrease because funders would have less invested in the underlying
lawsuit. The overall result would be a more balanced litigation landscape
where plaintiffs could receive third-party financing if needed, but the
bargaining advantage in favor of plaintiffs would be drastically reduced.

judgment or settlement to be large. . . . [They] prefer cases that are likely to settle quickly since the longer and
more complex a matter is, the greater their risk.”).
215 Cristoforo, supra note 204, at 921, 925–26; see also Stephen J. Cotten & Rudy Santore, Contingent
Fee Caps, Screening, and the Quality of Legal Services, 32 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 317, 326 (2012) (“[E]ven
seemingly innocuous restrictions on contingent fees, such as non-binding caps, can have significant behavioral
effects. More importantly, these behavioral effects can decrease the quality of legal services and reduce client
welfare.”); Eric Helland & Alexander Tabarrok, Contingency Fees, Settlement Delay, and Low-Quality
Litigation: Empirical Evidence from Two Datasets, 19 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 517, 540 (2003) (concluding that
“when contingency fees are limited . . . a reduction in legal-quality” results).
216 Cristoforo, supra note 204, at 921–23 (“[Contingency fee caps] only restrict access to the legal system
for claimants with low-damage claims and for those with more risk involved in their claims.”); James K.
Carroll et al., ABA, Report on Contingent Fees in Medical Malpractice Litigation 11 (Sept. 20, 2004) (draft
report), available at http://apps.americanbar.org/tips/contingent/MedMalReport092004DCW2.pdf.
217 See Shepherd, supra note 12, at 601.
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B. Enacting Registration Requirements for Third-Party Litigation Funders
In addition to recovery caps, this Comment proposes that all third-party
litigation funders must register and be licensed by a public regulatory
agency.218 This registration process would allow the regulatory agency to
monitor the activity of third-party litigation funders and make sure that
recovery caps are being honored. If any litigation funder is found in violation
of the regulations, that funder would lose its license and no longer be able to
legally invest in litigation claims.
By having each third-party litigation funder register, the public regulatory
agency could create a database containing information about every third-party
litigation funder, including its typical deal structure—the usual percentage of
recovery the funder requires and any threshold recovery amount that must first
go to the funder. This would provide plaintiffs seeking financing with data
about potential funders. The licensing and registration requirement would also
discourage deceptive funding practices and predatory funders219 because this
type of behavior would cause a third-party litigation funder to lose its license.
To succeed, this registration and licensing requirement would need to be a
nationwide or collaborative effort by all states in order to create a substantially
similar information disclosure procedure for third-party funders.220 If different
states enact their own disclosure standards, there would be information
asymmetry between the states, and third-party litigation financers might only
do business in states with more relaxed requirements that allow them to more
easily take advantage of potential plaintiffs.221 A nationwide or collaborative
system would address these concerns and provide a more uniform disclosure
standard nationwide.

218 See generally Martin, supra note 48, at 115 (arguing for a licensing system for third-party litigation
funders, and suggesting that “[t]he licensing system currently being created by the [National Association of
Securities Dealers] for the [Conference of State Bank Supervisors] for the mortgage industry could serve as a
model”).
219 Id.
220 See id. at 97–98, 115 (suggesting a collaborative state effort to regulate the third-party litigation
financing industry, much like the one in place to regulate the subprime mortgage industry).
221 See, e.g., Julia H. McLaughlin, Litigation Funding: Charting a Legal and Ethical Course, 31 VT. L.
REV. 615, 647–49 (2007) (discussing how different states’ treatment of ethical issues involved in third-party
funding of individual consumer lawsuits has caused varying standards of acceptability for these types of
agreements); Lyon, supra note 26, at 575 (“Laws governing third-party finance agreements appear to vary
significantly from state to state.”).

RICHEY GALLEYSPROOFS

2013]

1/31/2014 10:48 AM

TILTED SCALES OF JUSTICE

523

C. Extending Already-Enacted State Legislation Regulating Third-Party
Litigation Financing
The legislation that is in effect in Maine, Nebraska, and Ohio provides a
great foundation to craft expansive legislation that would govern all types of
third-party litigation investment.222 Currently, these state requirements do not
seem to be mandatory in commercial-litigation financing agreements.223 The
state regulations are framed in the context of ethics and consumer protection224
and do not address the risk imbalances caused by third-party litigation
financing addressed throughout this Comment.225 Broad regulations for thirdparty financing of commercial litigation based on existing state laws, as well as
a separate set of standards for third-party financing of individual consumer
lawsuits, should be enacted to protect overall consumer interests. These
regulations should include (1) requirements that particular contractual
language be included in agreements, (2) basic ethical standards to govern the
agreements, and (3) information disclosure requirements for funders to create
uniformity in litigation financing transactions within each subset of third-party
litigation financing—consumer and commercial. These regulations would help
plaintiffs seeking financing to choose the best litigation financing arrangement
for them, because the regulations would require all funding contracts to
disclose and explain relevant information and substantive contract terms.226
Incorporating other policies that are present in the enacted legislation into
the new broadly applicable rules would provide further consumer protections.
Beneficial consumer protections that should be enacted on a broad scale
include (1) requiring the funder to maintain a surety bond or line of credit to
ensure the financial viability of the financer; (2) prohibiting third-party
funders’ access to privileged information; and (3) barring third-party funders’
ability to make any decisions regarding the underlying civil action.227 Making
these regulations applicable in both the commercial- and consumer-litigation
contexts would protect all plaintiffs utilizing third-party litigation financing.
222 Maine Consumer Credit Code Legal Funding Practices, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9-A, §§ 12-101
to -107 (2009); Nonrecourse Civil Litigation Act, NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 25-3301 to -3309 (West Supp.
2010); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1349.55 (West Supp. 2013).
223 See Lyon, supra note 26, at 575.
224 See Loiseau et al., supra note 24, at 9.
225 See supra Part III (discussing the risk imbalances between plaintiffs and defendants).
226 See Martin, supra note 48, at 115–16 (“[Litigation] funding contracts should have to use plain,
ordinary language with topics clearly divided and captioned.”).
227 See NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 25-3303(1)(c), -3306, -3307(2); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1349.55(B)(3)
(barring third-party funders from making litigation decisions).
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The suggested requirements would demand compliance with uniform standards
of disclosure and consumer dealing, while solving possible conflicts of interest
issues.228 Combining these expanded regulations with the other suggestions in
this Comment would achieve the goal of balancing the scales of justice for
both plaintiffs and defendants by allowing plaintiffs to seek financing if
necessary, but stop the use of this third-party investment to financially
overwhelm defendants.
CONCLUSION
Third-party litigation financing in its purest form is designed to provide
access to justice to those who have meritorious claims, but cannot afford to
bring litigation on their own.229 In reality, third-party litigation financing has
resulted in large investment firms financing commercial litigation and has
created risk imbalances that favor plaintiffs. Plaintiffs can use the resources of
deep-pocketed third-party litigation funders to pursue litigation they might not
have been able to bring otherwise. These cases usually have required statutory
damages that result in exorbitant damage awards or force defendants into
inefficient settlements as a result of these distorted risk incentives.230
As third-party litigation financing becomes more prevalent in the United
States, these inefficiencies will only be intensified if the status quo remains,
resulting in the degradation of equity in the legal system. In order to rebalance
the scales of justice between plaintiffs and defendants, third-party litigation
financing must be overhauled in order to avoid inefficient outcomes and abuse
of the legal system. Adapting the concept of contingency fee caps to thirdparty litigation financing and using the framework of enacted third-party
litigation financing legislation in Maine, Nebraska, and Ohio, this Comment
has argued for (1) instituting caps on the recovery that financers can receive;
(2) enacting registration and licensing requirements for third-party litigation
funders; and (3) extending the Maine, Nebraska, and Ohio framework to create
228 These regulations could be similar to those for the Association of Litigation Funders in the United
Kingdom, which has a code of conduct for its member funders that suggests capital requirements and
restrictions on control of the lawsuit by the funder. Key Aspects, ASS’N LITIG. FUNDERS,
http://associationoflitigationfunders.com/code-of-conduct/key-aspects/ (last visited Oct. 28, 2013). This could
be helpful in crafting binding legislation for litigation funders in the United States. The Association of
Litigation Funders is a trade group and therefore has no authority or mechanism to bind funders to, or enforce,
its code of conduct. See Mission/Role, ASS’N LITIG. FUNDERS, http://associationoflitigationfunders.com/aboutus/mission-role/ (last visited Oct. 28, 2013). The U.S. legislation would need to be binding on all funders.
229 See Shepherd, supra note 12, 596–97.
230 See supra Part III.
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two sets of regulations to govern both commercial and consumer third-party
litigation financing.
If adopted, the proposals in this Comment would limit third-party litigation
funders’ investment in litigation by reducing their returns, thereby reinstating
many of the cost and risk deterrents plaintiffs face when filing a lawsuit.231 The
proposals would also create uniform disclosure standards to allow consumers
to be informed about taking on third-party investment,232 as well as extend
consumer protections to apply in both the consumer and the commercial thirdparty litigation financing contexts.233
Overall, third-party litigation financing in the United States needs to be
repaired in order to rebalance the scales of justice between plaintiffs and
defendants and restore fairness in the American legal system.
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